Philosophy of Mental Representation Review

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Philosophy of Mental Representation ReviewThe premise of the book is wonderful. Take five experts in the philosophy of mind. Have each of them present a paper critiquing one of the other group member's ideas. Have the author respond to the critic. Then have all five members discuss the issues raised in the original presentation. Finally, have an editor add an introductory piece for each presentation and publish the whole thing as a book. `Sounds like the stage is set for a stimulating, accessible discussion of an important set of issues, right? Well, sort of.
In the first section, John Haugeland interacts with Andy Clark's claim that, although we humans have much in common with other primates in terms of our basic cognitive mechanisms, the main difference between human cognition and that of other animals is, "...our amazing capacities to create and maintain a variety of special external structures (symbolic and social-institutional)...it is the human brain plus these chunks of external scaffolding that finally constitutes the smart, rational inference engine that we call mind." Haugeland objects to Clark's view of the mental on the grounds that it doesn't say anything about the importance of social normativity-Haugeland thinks that our ability to learn and abide by social norms is the primary distinguishing feature between us and other animals.
In the second section, Andy Clark discusses Daniel Dennett's idea that our minds are composed of (and in fact just *are*) a bunch of userless tools such as visual and pattern-matching apparatuses. The important difference between (certain) humans and other animals is that we are "florid thinkers"-rather than merely using symbols, we understand our use thereof. Clark is a big fan of Dennett's ideas, so there's pretty much nothing in the way of criticism in his essay.
In the third section, Robert Cummins discusses John Haugeland's theory of intentionality and objectivity. Cummins frames Haugeland's views around two separate issues; namely, what determines the target of a propositional attitude, and what target(s) is it possible for a given person (or other animal) to have? For example, could a dog have concepts like, `tennis ball' or `chess piece'? If not, then what is represented to a dog's mind when a dog sees a tennis ball or a chess piece, and what does this say about how mental representation works in general? Cummins interprets Haugeland as claiming that before an entity can see an object (e.g., a tennis ball) as that object, the entity must first possess the relevant concept (e.g., the concept of what a tennis ball is). Cummins objects that Haugeland's view has difficulty accounting for our learning these concepts in the first place, and how we can have these concepts as targets if we know nothing (or nearly nothing) about them.
In the fourth section, Brian Cantwell Smith critiques Robert Cummins' claim that representations of the world are structures whose contents are whatever a particular system (e.g., a person) represents the target(s) of the representation as being like. This view is markedly different from, that of, e.g., Fodor or Dretske who cache out mental contents in terms of causal relations between an object in the world and an individual (e.g., the concept `dog' means "dog" because it is reliably caused by dogs). Smith claims that Cummins' view as trouble with, among other things, targets that miss (as in a prairie dog mistaking a child's kite for a predator). He is also uneasy with the idea that there can be targets of representational states other than perceptual ones.
In the fifth section, Daniel Dennett discusses Brian Cantwell Smith's claim that a successful theory of representation requires us to rethink our ontology such that, for example, that the world is really not composed of discrete objects, but is instead a somewhat fuzzy, Heraclitean world of flux. "Objects" are simply read onto (or into?) the world by our minds (Smith calls it `preemptive registration'). I don't recall Dennett mentioning anything about this, but given the recent publication of books by authors claiming that physical objects don't really exist (e.g., Merricks's `Objects and Persons' and Van Inwagen's `Material Beings), I suppose the application of this ontology to mental representation isn't too surprising.
In the final section, Hugh Clapin defends the idea that mental representation requires the existence of both tacit and explicit mental content. He then argues for a particular computational view of representation which (allegedly) shows how the two types of content are related.
This book will benefit those who already have a grasp on the basics of the representational/propositional attitude side of the philosophy of mind and want a lively, up-to-date discussion of the nuances of these particular authors' views. On the other hand, this book will most certainly confuse (and likely bore the heck out of) anyone else. If you fall into this latter category and decide to read it, good luck. Also, two particular aspects of this book are less effective than they could be. First, the essays are ordered differently from how they were actually presented at the conference. Thus, when reading the discussion the reader will often come across a discussion of, or a reference to, subjects that were presented in essays that come later in the book. So, if you want to get some context on what they're taking about, you have to flip through the book to find out what was originally said. Secondly, during the discussion period the participants sometimes interrupt each other, which prevents them from completing a thought or objection. The reader is left having to speculate about how particular philosopher would've replied to this or that question or comment. Having said all that, here's my final bit of advice: unless you're *really* into this sort of thing and/or want to impress your friends by having a highly specialized philosophy book on your shelf, this book isn't something you'll want to buy for your own library. Rather, should you decide to read it, I'd recommend checking it out from a university library.Philosophy of Mental Representation OverviewIn Philosophy of Mental Representation five of the most original and important thinkers in philosophy of mind engage in an overlapping dialogue about mental representation. In new papers, contributors Andy Clark, Robert Cummins, Daniel Dennett, John Haugeland and Brian Cantwell Smith each investigate the views and claims of one of the other contributors regarding mental representation. The subject then offers a reply. An exciting feature of this collection is the dynamic discussion among all contributors following each exchange. This collection offers the latest thinking on mental representation carefully and critically analyzed by the leading thinkers in the field.

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